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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
of covenant is at an end. This in effect imposes a permanent in-
capacity to hold title against the covenantee 41 and his assigns. 2
A situation approaching the impossible in detection arises
where the wife of a mortgagor joins in the second mortgage.
Later the first mortgage is foreclosed and the wife subsequently
changes her name through divorce or re-marriage and then re-
acquires the property. The Miller case implies that the unsatis-
fied recorded junior mortgage would be constructive notice to
subsequent purchasers from the wife.
Since North Dakota has unequivocally adopted the theory
of revival of mortgages, the only possible solution is to except
the prior mortgage specifically and distinctly from the covenants
of warranty in the second mortage.43 Although only a few cases
have been litigated on this point, the possibility exists that a
grantee in the chain of title may be one against whom the un-
satisfied second mortgage may revive. It is incumbent that every
precaution be taken in the examination of the abstract to protect
the client against such a contingency.
JOHN G. MUTSCHLER
TRUSTS. - IMPLIED TRUSTS IN NORTH DAKOTA. - An implied
trust is a trust created by operation of law I as distinguished from
an express trust which is created by words or conduct of the
settlor.'-' Into a single section 3 of the North Dakota Code
are concentrated all the methods of creating implied trusts. Sec-
tion 59-0106 of the code provides:
"An implied trust arises in the following cases:
1. One who wrongfully detains a thing is an implied
trustee thereof for the benefit of the owner.
2. One who gains a thing by fraud, accident, mistake, un-
due influence, the violation of a trust, or other wrongful act, is,
unless he has some other and better right thereto, an implied
trustee of the thing gained for the benefit of the person who
would otherwise have had it;
3. Each one to whom property is transferred in vio-
41. Merchants National Bank v. Miller, 59 N.D. 273, 285, 229 N.W. 357, 362
(1930) "... he is estopped from claiming (discharge in bankruptcy), so far as subsequent
title to the property is concerned, that the property is not affected by his solemn warranty.
He is simply not heard on that proposition. If he has any bad motive in mind to relieve
himself from any agreements which he is estopped from asserting, it would be better for
him to say farewell to the land and never again acquire an interest therein."; 52 Harv.
L. Rev. 1177 (1939).
42. Patton, Titles §125 (1938).
43. See illustrated examples note 37, supra.
1. N.D. Rev. Code §59-0105 (1943).
2. N.D. Rev. Code }59-0104 (1943).
3. N.D. Rev. Code 159-0106 (1943).
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lation of a trust holds the same as an implied trustee under
such trust, unless he purchased it in good faith and for a
valuable consideration;
4. When a transfer of real property is made to one
person and the consideration therefor is paid by or for an-
other, a trust is presumed to result in favor of the person by
or for whom such payment is made."
It should be noted at the outset that the code speaks only
in terms of implied trusts and omits any direct recognition of
the historical distinction between the two types of implied trusts,
generally called constructive and resulting trusts. This note is
concerned with the construction and operation of the foregoing
code section. Constructive and resulting trusts will be treated
separately, in spite of the code's failure to acknowledge the dis-
tinction, because vital practical differences distinguish the two
types of trusts.
I. CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS
The first three sub-divisions of the above quoted code sec-
tion deal with the creation of constructive trusts. The fourth
sub-division concerns resulting trusts. A constructive trust is
a device employed by equity, and exclusively by equity in this
state,4 to aid the rightful owner of property in recovering its
possession from one who wrongfully obtained or retains it. The
rationale is that equity, in the interest of fair play and sub-
stantial justice between the parties, will not recognize more than
a bare legal title in one who acquires or withholds another's
property wrongfully.5 It would be unconscionable to allow such
a one to profit from his own wrong.6 "Chancery may compel one
who unfairly holds a property interest to convey that interest to
another to whom it justly belongs."7 An important attribute is
that, once declared by equity, a constructive trust is retroactive
to render the wrongdoer a trustee from the time his control of the
property first became wrongful." However this does not mean
that constructive trust principles operate automatically; only a
4. Prondziski v. Garbut, 8 N.D. 191, 77 N.W. 1012 (1898); Jasper v. Hazen,
1 N.D. 75, 44 N.W. 1018 (1890).
5. Restatement, Restitution, §160 (1937).
6. "A constructive trust is the formula through which the conscience of equity finds
expression. When property has been acquired in such circumstances that the holder of the
legal title may not in good conscience retain the beneficial interest, equity converts him into
a trustee." Justice Cardozo, in Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 225 N.Y. 380,
122 N.E. 378, 380 (1919).
7. 3 Bogert, Trusts & Trustees 3 (Part 1, 1946).
8. 3 Bogert, Trusts & Trustees 4 (Part 1, 1946).
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decree of equity can impress property with a constructive trust.9
Another vital attribute of the constructive trust is that it
requires no intent of the parties that a: trust be created. In
fact most constructive trusts are imposed in spite of or without
regard to the intent of the parties. 10 Herein lies the chief dis-
tinction between constructive and resulting trusts. A resulting
trust cannot be proved without clear and convincing evidence that
the trustor intended the trustee to hold less than full beneficial
title."' One learned writer emphasized this difference by refer-
fering to constructive trusts as "fraud rectifying" trusts while
labeling resulting trusts as "intent enforcing" trusts.12
A. WRONGFUL DETENTION
The first three subdivisions of §59-0106 enumerate the siu-
ations in which the courts declare a constructive trust. the sec-
tion begins: "One who wrongfully detains a thing is an implied
trustee thereof for the benefit of the owner .... ., 13 The im-
mediately apparent purpose of this language is to allow recov-
ery in cases where the defendant originally acquired the pro-
perty by legitimate means, but by subsequent wrongful conduct,
or omission, rendered the continuance of his control inequitable.
It has been held that a plaintiff seeking a constructive trust
under this subsection need not allege fraud in the transaction
by which the defendant procured the property, because equity
considers mere inactive retention of another's property for a sel-
fish advantage to be constructive fraud and grounds for impress-
ing the property with a trust. 4 An illustrative case is Equity Ele-
vator & T. Co. v. Farmers' & Merchants' Bank 15 where the plain-
tiff had deposited money in the defendant bank upon the latter's
agreement to meet certain drafts to be drawn by the plaintiff.
The defendant bank became insolvent, and the plaintiff had to
pay the drafts himself. Although there was no claim of fraud
in the acceptance of the plaintiffs deposit, a constructive trust
was decreed because of the defendant's failure to apply the de-
posit for the agreed purpose. It was said that it would be in-
9. See Barker v. Barker, 75 N.D. 253, 263, 27 N.W.2d 576, 582 (1947).
10. 4 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence §1044 (Symons, 1941).
11. Carter v. Carter, 14 N.D. 66, 103 N.W. 425 (1905) (no trust enforced because
proof was sketchy); cf Bernauer v. McCaull-Webster Elevator Co., 41 N.D. 561, 171
N.W. 282 (1919).
12. Costigan, The Classification of Trusts as Express, Resulting, and Constructive,
27 Harv. L. Rev. 437 (1914).
13. N.D. Rev. Code §59-0106, (1) (1943).
14. Hanson v. Svarverud, 18 N.D. 550, 120 N.W. 550 (1909).
15. 64 N.D. 95, 250 N.W. 529 (1933).
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equitable to allow the bank to retain the plaintiff's money and
leave him to the remedies of an ordinary creditor against the
insolvent bank's assets. Where a deposit is made for a stated
purpose, the bank's non-performance of that purpose amounts
to fraud in equity and renders the bank a trustee of funds so
deposited. 6
Another case where wrongful detention short of active fraud
gave rise to a constructive trust was Cardiff v. Marquis.17 There
the plaintiff had conveyed land to her father in response to his
good faith representation that he could profit by selling her
land together with an adjacent tract of his own. He agreed
to remit a share of the proceeds to the plaintiff, but died be-
fore performing. The plaintiff was allowed to impress a construc-
tive trust upon her father's estate for the proceeds. Obviously
neither the plaintiffs father nor his administrator had actively
perpetrated fraud upon the plaintiff, but the court thought the
unjust enrichment of the father's estate sufficient excuse for
equitable intervention. A highly influential, if not decisive cir-
cumstance, was the close personal relation of the parties."' The
case exemplifies numerous instances where a plaintiff whose le-
gal right is without a remedy because of evidentiary rules"
or the Statute of Frauds 20 falls, back on the extraordinary relief
of equity.
Apparently the use of the word "thing" 21 in the statute to
denote the trust res does not limit operation of this subsection
to personalty, for constructive trusts for wrongful detention of
realty are common. Typical is the case of Hughes v. Fargo Loan
Agency." In that case the grantor had deeded land to his son
on the parol understanding that the son was to pay the proceeds
to the grantor for life, then divide the land equally among the
grantor's children. The court held that by failing to divide the
land as agreed, the grantee became a constructive trustee for the
16. Cf. Morton v. Woolery, 48 N.D. 1132, 189 N.W. 232 (1922) (bank bound by
conditions of deposit; misapplication justifies recovery as trust deposit).
17. 17 N.D. 110, 114 N.W. 1088 (1908).
18. Id. at 118, 114 N.W. at 1090.
19. E.g. N.D. Rev. Code §31-0103 (1943) strict application of this statute for-
bidding testimony concerning conversations with a deceased person and the consequent
hardship can be obviated by equity).
20. N.D. Rev. Code §47-1001 (1943) "An estate in real property ... can be
transferred only by operation of law or by an instrument in writing .. ." (Italics added);
N.D. Rev. Code §59-0303 (1943) "No trust in relation to real property is valid unless
created or declared: 1. By a written instrument, subscribed by the trustee or by his
agent thereto authorized in writing; 2. By the instrument under which the trustee claims
the estate affected; or 3. By operation of law." (italics added).
2.1. N.D. Rev. Code §59-0106 (1943). "One who wrongfully detains a thing is
an implied trustee thereof..."
22. 46 N.D. 26, 178 N.W. 993 (1920).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
benefit of the grantor's children. Here the conditions imposed
in the original transfer amounted to an oral express trust, but
were unforceable as such because of the Statute of Frauds.
23
However, constructive trusts have never been within the prohibi-
tion of the Statute of Frauds. 4  A court of equity "in granting
relief in case of an oral agreement, proceeds upon the ground of
fraud, actual or constructive, and enforces the agreement, not-
withstanding the statute, by reason of the special circumstances...
it will not permit the Statute of Frauds to be used as in instru-
ment of fraud . 2. ."  As in other wrongful detention cases, the
grantee who takes real property subject to an oral trust initially
procures control without fraud, but by failing to honor the oral
trust converts his title to a wrongful claim. Equity will not
countenance such abuse of a trust, and, branding the grantee's,
defection as constructive fraud, the court proceeds to grant prac-
tical relief with little regard to technical objections.
B. WRONGFUL ACQUISITION
The second subsection in the code section above set out
asserts that one may be declared a constructive trustee of any
property gained through: (1) fraud, (2) accident or mistake,
(3) undue influence, (4) the violation of a trust, or (5) other
wrongful act.26  In cases arising under this subsection the plain-
tiffs right depends upon establishing that the defendant origin-
ally obtained the controverted property through some unfair means
tantamount to equitable fraud.27 Except in instances of accident
or mistake, constructive trust principles are invoked in these
cases because the defendant's control over the plaintiff's pro-
perty was wrongful in the first instance. Cases involving acci-
dent or mistake usually fall into the category of resulting trusts,"8
23. See note 20 supra.
24. The original English Statute of Frauds expressly excepted from its operation
both constructive and resulting trusts. 29 Chas. II, c. 3, §VIII.
25. Cardiff v. Marquis, 17 N.D. 110, 118, 114 N.W. 1088, 1091 (1908).
26. N.D. Rev. Code §59-0106 (1943); cf. Dak. Comp. Laws §3920 (1887). "One
who gains a thing by fraud, accident, mistake, undue influence, the violation of a trust,
or other wrongful act, is, unless he has some other and better right thereto, an involuntary
trustee of the thing gained, for the benefit of the person who would otherwise have had it."
27. See 4 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence 95, n. 12 (Symons, 1941) "So far as the
results which flow from the existence of a constructive or involuntary trust are concerned,
it is immaterial whether the acts from which the trust arises are found to be fraudulent in
fact, or be deemed fraudulent in law. The intent with which the acts were done becomes
immaterial. The trust arises with the same effect regardless of intent." Citing Stianson v.
Stianson, 40 S.D. 322, 167 N.W. 237 (1918).
28. See, eg.,. Redman v. Biewer, 48 N.W.2d 372 (N.D. 1951) (money furnished
by wife for property mistakenly deeded in husband's name); Kernkamp v. Schultz, 44 N.D.
20, 176 N.W. 108 (1919) (mistake in deed grounded resulting trust). But cf. Wehe v.
Wehe,. 44 N.D. 280, 175 N.W. 366 (1919) (no trust arose from mistaken deed to wife
because husband filed to assert claim before wife's death).
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but may justify imposition of constructive trusts where con-
structive fraud, based on wrongful continuance of the control
after discovery of the mistake, is present.
1. Fraud
Where property is obtained by fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion of material fact, the defrauded owner should be allowed
to assert his equitable title over the property in the defrauder's
hands, and the court so holds. 29  An affirmative misrepresenta-
tion amounts to fraud only if it relates to a material fact and is:
(1) made by one who knows or should know its falsity, and
(2) made to induce action or non-action by one who in fact
acts or fails to act in reliance on that inducement.30
In clear cases of fraud the deed may be cancelled,3  or
the suit may be in tort for damages, 32 thus bypassing the issue
of constructive trust. But where the fraud is not obvious, as
in cases where the fact misrepresented is the defendant's state
of mind at the time of the conveyance, constructive trust is the
usual remedy. Such a case was Barker v. Barker,33 a suit be-
tween the parties to a previous divorce. The suit involved a
post-divorce property arrangement by which the former husband
had orally agreed to make the down payment and future deferred
payments on a house for the former wife and their two children.
The wife was to receive a one-half interest in the house, but had
to agree to joint liability on the note and mortgage. The plain-
tiff wife, after signing the note and mortgage, discovered that
her former mate had taken title in himself as sole owner. The
wife was allowed to impress the title with a constructive trust
for the one-half interest promised her. In holding the defend-
ant guilty of fraud, the court stated, "Fraud in equity includes
all willful or intentional acts, omissions, and concealments which
involve a breach of either legal or equitable duty, trust or con-
fidence, and are injurious to another, or by which an undue
or unconscientious advantage over another is obtained." 34 The
29. Currie v. Look, 14 N.D. 482, 106 N.W. 131 (1905); Prondzinski v. Garbut,
10 N.D. 300, 86 N.W. 969 (1901) (the plaintiff may elect to recover the specific property,
or its proceeds with interest, or the value of the property, with interest).
30. 3 Bogert, Trusts & Trustees 20 (Part 1; 1946).
31. See, e.g., Currie v. Look, 14 N.D. 482, 106 N.W. 131 (1905) (trial court
cancelled deed, but the appellate court went beyond that relief to impress *a constructive
trust and compel a conveyance by the trustee).
32. Guild v. More, 32 N.D. 432, 155 N.W. 44 (1915); see Tvedt v. Haugen, 70
N.D. 338, 347, 294 N.W. 183, 187 (1940) (court stated obiter dictum that a
physician who misrepresents his ability to effect a cure is liable in an action of deceit).
33. 75 N.D. 253, 27 N.W.2d 576 (1947).
34. Id. at 262, 27 N.W.2d at 582.
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court added that the relation of divorced husband and wife is
a confidential relation within the rule of allowing constructive
trust relief for violation of such relation. It is submitted that
decision of the question of confidential relation was unnecessary,
because the essentials of equitable fraud were present regard-
less of the former marital status of the parties.
35
A second class of fraud cases are those where the defendant
is guilty of no affirmative misrepresentation, but defrauds the
plaintiff by failing to speak when under a duty to speak. Thus
in State v. Farmers' State Bank 36 the defendant bank had accepted
the plaintiff's deposit without notifying the plaintiff that there
had been a "run" on the bank and that its directors had discussed
a temporary suspension of business. It was held that the deposit
was accepted subject to an implied trust, since it was constructive
fraud not to warn the prospective depositor of the imminent clos-
ing. The court indicated that even if the directors had believed the
bank solvent, or if in fact it had been solvent when the deposit
was accepted, there was a duty to fully appraise a depositor of
an intention to temporarily suspend business, before accept-
ing his money. Constructive fraud existed because "reception of
a deposit is an assurance by the bank .. .that the amount of the
deposit will be paid to the depositors upon demand.... 37
Instead of the normal debtor-creditor relation, such a deposit
creates a trust relation based on the bank's non-feasance. The
fraud is entirely negative. It is unlikely that the bank's omission
would amount to legal fraud sufficient to ground a tort action.38
2. Accident or Mistake
Generally where one gains real property through accident or
mistake he is treated as trustee of a resulting trust, and no pro-
blem of constructive trust is raised. However, if one should
receive property accidentally or through a mistaken conveyance,
there is no doubt that he could be compelled to convey it if his
holding became wrongful by refusal to correct the mistake. 39
Cases involving personalty are suscept ible of solution on the
wrongful detention theory. The court has on occasion seemed un-
certain whether to solve accident and mistake cases on constructive
35. Id. at 264, 27 N.W.2d at 582 (concurring opinion).
36. 62 N.D. 426, 244 N.W. 45 (1932).
37. Id. at 430, 244 N.W. at 47.
38. See Restatement, Torts §550, comment a (1938).
39. Kernkamp v. Schultz, 44 N.D. 20, 176 N.W. 108 (1919).
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or resulting trust principles.40 It is submitted that, since the
determing factors in such cases are intent and payment of con-
sideration rather than fraud, the problem is properly one of re-
sulting trust." It has been held that one claiming a construc-
tive trust based on mistake may be estopped, or barred, by fail-
ure to assert his claim until after the death of the person named




The rule is well established in equity that one standing
in a confidential 13 or fiduciary relation " to another must not
in any way exercise undue influence or take advantage of the
confidence reposed in him to gain property advantage. 45 In
cases of undue influence the usual requirement of clear and
convincing proof of fraud is relaxed, because "the law presumes
that the influence ... upon the mind of the person who confided
was undue, and a case of constructive trust arises, not however,
on the ground of actual fraud, but because of the facility for
practicing it." 41 Any dealings between persons who occupy close
postions of mutual trust arouse the suspicion of equity. One
who would retain profits from such dealing must assume the bur-
den of establishing the good faith of his conduct, 47 or be con-
verted into a trustee.
48
The 1950 case of Rovenko v. Bokovoy 4 is a good example
40. Id. at 29, 176 N.W. at 111, 112 citing both constructive and resulting trust
code sections).
41. Redman v. Biewer, 48 N.W.2d, 372, 377 (N.D. 1951) "The evidence in
this case shows that the entire consideration was paid with plaintiff's monies and that
there was no intention on her part or on the part of her husband that plaintiff should
make a gift of the land to her husband."
42. Wehe v. Wehe 44 N.D. 280, 175 N.W. 366 (1919).
43. N.D. Rev. Code §59-0108 (1943). "Everyone who voluntarily assumes
a relation of personal confidence with another is deemed a trustee within the meaning
of this chapter not only as to the person who reposes such confidence, but as to all
persons of whose affairs he thus acquires information which was given to such person
in the like confidence, or over whose affairs he, by such confidence, obtains any con-
trol."
44. N.D. Rev. Code §59-0109 (1943). "In all matters connected with his trust,
a trustee is bound to act in the highest good faith toward his beneficiary and may
not obtain any advantage therein over the latter by the slightest misrepresentation,
concealment, threat, or adverse pressure of any kind."
45. N.D. Rev. Code §59-0112 (1943). "A trustee may not use the influence
which his position gives him to obtain any advantage from his beneficiary." I Perry,
Trusts & Trustees §195 (7th ed. 1929).
46. Arntson v. First National Bank, 39 N.D. 408, 419, 167 N.W. at 764 (1918).
47. N.D. Rev. Code §59-0116 (1943). "All transactions between a trustee and
his beneficiary during the existence of the trust or while the influence acquired by
the trustee remains, by which he obtains any advantage from his beneficiary, are
presumed to be entered into by the latter without sufficient consideration and under
undue influence."
48. I Perry, Trusts & Trustees §193 (7th ed. 1929).
49. 77 N.D. 740, 45 N.W.2d 492 (1950).
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because it involved both the fiduciary relation of principal and
agent, and the personal relation of half-brother and half-sister.
There the defendant was a wholesale grocer and half-brother of
the plaintiff, who, with her deceased husband, had been a farmer
with neither formal education nor business experience. The plain-
tiff and her husband moved to Canada leaving management of
their farmlands to the defendant as their agent. On the plaintiff's
return many years later, the defendant informed her that she had
lost the lands by tax foreclosures, and that he, the defendant,
had redeemed them in his own right and was fee simple owner.
The court found there had been overreaching which warranted
imposition of a trust. In addition it was held that the usual
statute of limitations had not run to perfect the defendant's
claim by adverse possession. It was said that a holding under
constructive trust cannot become adverse unless there is an
open assertion of the hostile claim, and such assertion is brought
to the knowledge of the true owner. '  No mere lapse of time
can defeat the interest of a beneficiary in trust property.6
Whether a particular relationship is a confidential relation
within the above rule is a question of fact.52  The term "con-
fidential relation" cannot be reduced to the narrow confines
of exact definition, but can be defined only by the gradual pro-
cess of judicial inclusion or exclusion of specific relations."
Among relationships considered confidential the North Dakota
court has included the relations of parent and child, 4 half-
brother and half-sister,z5 divorced husband and wife,"6 physician
and patient, 7 principal and agent, "- bank and depositor, 9 mort-
50. N.D. Rev. Code §59-0114 (1943). "If a trustee acquires any interest . . .
adverse to the interest of his beneficiary in the subject of the trust, he immediately
must inform the latter thereof and may he removed at once." Cf. §59-0111.
51. See Rovenko v. Bokovoy, 77 N.D. 740, 754, 45 N.W.2d 492, 499 (1950).
52. 3 Bogert, Trusts & Trustees §482 (Part 1, 1946).
53. Sours v. Colvin, 55 N.W.2d 462, 465 (Iowa 1952) "Confidential rela-
tionship is not restricted to any particular association of persons. It exists whenever
there is a trust and confidence, regardless of its origin .... The character and the
duty of the relationship are immaterial. They may he legal, but not necessarily so.
They may be social, domestic, or personal, and, their origin is wholly immaterial."
54. Arntson v. First National Bank, 39 N.D. 408, 167 N.W. 760 (1918) (fatht'r
died without making a will relying on oral promise of sons to convey land to their
mother when inherited); Hanson v. Svarverud, 18 N.D. 550. 120 N.W. 550 (1909)
(deed absolute from parents held subject to oral trust to remit proceeds to grantors
for their lives, then divide land equally among their children; see McDonald v. Miller
73 N.D. 474, 481, 16 N.W.2d 270, 272 (1944) (good example of factors con-
sidered).
55. Rovenko v. Bokovoy, 77 N.D. 740, 45 N.W.2d 492 (1950).
56. Barker v. Barker, 75 N.D. 253, 27 N.W.2d 576 (1947).
57. See Tvedt v. Haugen, 70 N.D. 338, 347, 294 N. W. 183, 187 (1940).
58. Northern Dakota Elevator Co. v. Clark, 3 N.D. 26, 53 N.W. 175 (1892).
59. State v. Farmers' State Bank, 62 N.D. 426, 244 N.W. 45 (1932) (failure to
make full and frank disclosure of intent to suspend business).
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gagee and mortagor,"o and business partnership.- It is obvious
that some of the above relations are of a purely business nature
and not confidential in the ordinary sense of the word. How-
ever, the court has applied the rule whenever one who in fact
relied upon the entire good faith of another has suffered detri-
ment through abuse of his confidence.
4. The Violation of a Trust
Where property is held subject to an express trust, the "trtAstee
is held to the utmost good faith in all dealings with the trust pro-
perty. He is bound to the cestui que trust for the payment of
every farthing properly due, as proceeds or products of trust
property ... ."" The trustee can not obtain any advantage over the
beneficiary "by the slightest misrepresentation, concealment, threat,
or adverse pressure of any kind." a" A trustee who wrougfully
disposes of trust property '" or deals with it for personal gain,;.,
may be required to account for any proceeds with interest,,;
or to compensate by paying the full value.' These principles
apply although the express trust under which the property is
originally held may be invalid and unenforceable.(" In the lat-
ter cases it is the constructive trust, not the express trust, that is
enforced.
In General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Thompson,t) the
plaintiff had entrusted possession of an automobile to at auto
dealer on the latter's written promise not to sell or otherwise
60. Farmers State Bank v. Anton, 51 N.D. 202, 199 N.W. 582 (1924) (failure to
redeem during lawful period in reliance on promise to extend time).
61. Engstrom v. Larson, 55 N.W.2d 579 (N.D. 1952); Bodding v. Herman,
76 N.D. 324, .5 N.W.2d 561 (1949).
62. jasper v. Hazen, I N.D. 75, 81, 44 N.W. 1018, 1020 (1890) (detfoant took
title for security only but sold the land in violation.of oral trust).
63. N.D. Rev. Code §59-0109 (1943).
64. Cf. Anderson v. Bank, 6 N.D. 497, 72 N.W. 916 (1897), af'd. 172 U.S. 573
(1899) (plaintiff sued for conversion instead of seeking constructive trust).
65. N.D. Rev. Code §59-0110 (1943). "A trustee shall not use or (lea] with the
trust property for his own profit or for any other purpose not connected with the trust.
If he does so, he, at the option of the beneficiary, may be required to accont for all
profits-mad, thereby, or to pay the value of the use of the trust property, and, if he has
disposed thereof, to replace it with its fruits or to account for its proceeds with iterest."
66. General' Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Thompson, 70 N.D. 99, 292 N.W. 85
(1940); see Jasper v. Hazen, 1 N.D. 75, 84, 44 N.W. 1018, 1021 (189(f) (imprisoned
owner entrusted land title and management to defendant who converted it).
67. Larson v. Baird, 60 N.D. 775, 236 N.W. 634 (1931) (trust impressed to extent
of value of bonds misappropriated); Prondzinski v. Garbut, 10 N.D. 3t00. 86 N.W.
969 (1901) (malfeasant trustee cannot, by placing trust realty beyond reach of cestui
by selling it to a bona fide purchaser, force the latter to accept the proceeds of the sale
for he may recover the value of the land).
' 68. See Hanson v. Svarverud, 18 N.D. 550, 120 N.W. 550, 552 (1909) "There
can be no doubt but that the defendant's promise to convey was invalid, and could not
be enforced."
69. 70 N.D. 99, 292 N.W. 85 (1940).
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dispose of the car until the plaintiff had been fully paid. The
agreement was embodied in the form of a trust receipt.7" After
selling the car in violation of the trust receipt terms, the dealer
died leaving an insolvent estate. The court held that the plain-
tiff could impress a trust on the insolvent's bank account because
it appeared that the proceeds of the tainted sale had been there
deposited. The money received from the unauthorized sale was
received in a fiduciary capacity amounting to a quasi trust. Not
only was the dealer a constructive trustee, but so also was the
bank after notification and demand by the plaintiff.7' "If one
sells the property of another and deposits the money in a bank in
his own name, upon notice to the bank, by the owner of the pro-
perty, of the facts, and a demand for the money, the bank be-
comes a quasi or constructive trustee for the true owner." 72
A similar case was Larson v. Baird,7 3 where the defendant
bank converted and sold the plaintiff's bonds which had been left
for "safe-keeping" in the bank's vault. The bank failed, and the
plaintiff sued the receiver claiming a trust preference in assets.
In allowing recovery the court said, "The bank was acting in a
fiduciary capacity and held the bonds in trust. . . . Plaintiff's
claim is based on the right of property, the title to which is not
affected by a change in the trust property. . . . A mere change
in the form of property confided to and converted by a trustee
does not change the ownership, the beneficiary remaining the
owner." 14 Here again violation of an express trust grounded
equitable imposition of an implied trust.
75
5. Or Other Wrongful Act.
This clause seems to be a catchall phrase intended to include
by anticipation any inequitable conduct not within the previ-
70. See N.D. Rev. Code c. 59-06 (Supp. 1949) (Uniform Trust Receipts Act).
71. Denomination of the relation created by a trust receipt as a trust seems a
strained interpretation of the trust receipt transaction. A trust receipt is a financing de-
vice and would ordinarily give an automobile dealer the beneficial ownership of the pro-
perty, subject only to a security title retained by the financing house, the plaintiff here.
The very purpose of this financing method is to enable dealers to obtain goods on credit
for resale. Vold, Sales 341, et seq. (1931). It seems strange, therefore, to find a court
holding the sale anticipated as the purpose of the trust receipt's issuance to be a vio-
lation of a trust. A trust receipt is not a trust, in spite of the North Dakota Code's class-
fication of this credit device under the heading of trusts. See note 70 supra. Compare
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Thompson, 70 N.D. 99, 292 N.W. 85 (1940), with
Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328 (1934) (trust receipt does not ground
trust preference in bankruptcy).
72. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Thompson, 70 N.D. 99, 109, 292 N. W. 85,
88 (1940).
73. 60 N. D. 775, 236 N.W. 634 (1931).
74. Id. at 780, 236 N.W. at 636.
75, Cf. Equity Elevator & T. Co. v. Farmers & M. Bank, 64 N.D. 95, 250 N.W.
529 (1933) (special deposit to meet designated checks constituted constructive trust
res).
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ously enumerated categories. The broad phraseology indicates
the general attitude of equity not to narrowly confine relief from
any unfair conduct which should entitle the plaintiff to relief in
furtherance of substantial justice. The attitude is commendable.
C. LIMITATIONS & ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES
The first and most obvious limitation upon the right of a
cestui to recover his property by constructive trust is the bona
fide purchaser rule. This rule, codified in North Dakota,'7  lim-
its both implied and express trusts. Simply stated, the rule is that
a transfer of the legal title of property to one who gives val-
uable consideration and has neither actual nor record notice of
the trust cuts off the cestui's equities in the property and gives
the transferee full legal and equitable title clear of the trust.
7 7
There is no doubt that a constructive trustee conveys good title
to an innocent third person who buys for value and that such
a purchaser is not liable to the defrauded rightful owner.7 8  In
North Dakota, it has been held that pre-existing debt does not
constitute value within the bona fide purchaser rule as applied
to realty 79 but subsequent, as distinguished from antecedent,
creditors are protected. The rule may be different where the
property involved is personalty,81 a negotiable instrument, 112
or a stock certificate.
83
Where the constructive trustee has placed the original
trust property beyond the reach of the cestui by selling to a
76. N.D. Rev. Code §59-0106 (3) (1943). "Each one to whom property is
transferred in violation of a trust holds the same as an implied trustee under such
trust, unlss he purchased it in good faith and for a valuable consideration .... ""
N.D. Rev. Code §59-0308 (1943). "No implied or resulting trust can prejudice the
right of a purchaser or encumbrancer of real property for value and without notice
of the trust."
77. 4 Bogert, Trusts & Trustees §881 (Part 1, 1948).
78. See Skelly Oil Co. v. Johnson, 209 Ark. 1107, 194 S.W.2d 425, 435 (1946)
(oil and gas lease to bona fide lessee cut off equities of constructive trust cestui).
79. Merchants Bank v. Schatz, 59 N.D. 365, 230 N.W. 18 (1930); cf. N.D.
Rev. Code §1-0120 (1943). "A valuable consideration shall mean a thing of value
parted with, or a ncw obligation assumed at the time of obtaining a thing...."
(italics added).
80. N.D. Rev. Code §59-0309 (1943). "Where an express trust is created in
relation to real property but is not contained or declared in the grant to the trustee
or in an instrument signed by him and recorded in the same office with the grant
to the trustee, such grant shall be deemed absolute in favor of the subsequent creditors
of the trustee not having notice of the trust and in favor of purchasers from such
trustees without notice and for a valuable consideration.
81. A pre-existing or antecedent claim constitutes value under the Uniform Sales Act.
N.D. Rev. Code §51-0101 (21) (1943).
82. N.D. Rev. Code §41-0302 (1943). "An antecedent or pre-existing debt
constitutes -value .. " (Negotiable Instruments Law).
83. N.D. Rev. Code §10-1821 (10) (1943). "An antecedent or preexisting obli-
gation, whether for money or not, constitutes value where a certificate is taken either
in satisfaction thereof or as security therefor." (Uniform Stock Transfer Act).
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bona fide purchaser, or has otherwise made it impossible to im-
press a trust upon the specific property originally subject to the
trust, a complicated problem is presented. How far may the
cestui go in subjecting assets of the defaulting trustee to his
trust? The conflict of North Dakota decisions on this point is
typical of the conflict among the several states, and within
many individual states. Of course where the cestui can show
that specific money or property presently held by the trustee
came to him through his wrongful dealing with trust property,
or as the proceeds of an unauthorized sale of trust property,
a constructive trust will be impressed on the identified assets.
It is fundamental that a mere change in the form in which pro-
perty is held does not change the ownership.84 Therefore all
courts allow a cestui to pursue his equitable claim as long as
he can "trace" or follow the trust property and actually identify
the specific property or its proceeds in the hands of the trustee
or a third person not a bona fide purchaser. Apparently the ma-
jority of American courts limit recovery to situations where
"tracing" and identification are possible.85
In contrast to the "tracing" theory is the "swollen assets"
theory, by which many courts give the trust claimant a prefer-
ence over general creditors in the assets of the malfeasant trus-
tee. The proponents of the "swollen assets" theory reason that
where the trustee misapplies trust funds to pay his own liabil-
ities, the end result is an increase in the assets of the trustee's
personal estate, for if he bad not met his own liabilities with
trust funds, he would have had to deplete his personal assets
to meet them. Therefore it follows that the present assets of the
malfeasant trustee are greater by the amount of the misappro-
priated trust funds, and his personal assets should be subjec-
ted to a constructive trust to the extent of funds misapplied.
Bogert is sharply critical of this theory but admits that many
cases have accepted it.86
Early North Dakota decisions adhered strictly to the ma-
jority "tracing" rule, the first case to expressly reject the "swol-
len assets" theory being Northern Dakota Elevator Co. v. Clark.
ST
84. "No change in the form of the trust property, effected by the trustee, will
impede the rights of the beneficial owner to reach it and to compel its transfer, pro-
vided it can be identified as a distinct fund, and is not so mingled up with other
moneys or property that it can no longer be specifically separated. . . . The product




85. 4 Bogert, Trusts & Trustees §921 (Part 2, 1948).
86. 4 Bogert, Trusts & Trustees §922 (Part 2, 1948).
87. 3 N.D. 26, 53 N.W. 175 (1892).
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There the trust property was misappropriated by one mem-
ber of the defendant partnership before it could be absorbed
into the general assets of the firm. The firm became insolvent
and the plaintiff claimed a trust preference in the assets. His
claim was denied because he could not trace his property into
any specific firm asset. In an excellent opinion, Justice Corliss
wrote: "The theory on which alone plaintiff can secure pri-
ority ... is that the identical money can be traced in some form
from plaintiff to Clark & Smart, and that it was still suscept-
ible of identification .... But it is claimed that the proceeds ...
went to enrich the estate of Clark & Smart, and that, therefore,
the plaintiff is entitled to priority of payment. Authorities are
cited to sustain this view. . . .They stand on no principle, and
are opposed to a much stronger array of decisions. The plain-
tiff . . . cannot identify any particular portion of the assets in
the hands of the defendant as being its property. Neither can
it trace such property into any particular fund.- The very most
that can be claimed is that the plaintiff's property has gone
into the general mass of the property .. ." 8 In 1892 this was
not considered sufficient foundation for a preference, since
the court reasoned that all creditors had contributed to increase
the estate of the insolvent.
By 1911, however, the "swollen assets" theory had gained
a foothold in North Dakota. In that year the court decided
Widman v. Kellogg 89 and without express recognition of the
"swollen assets" theory nevertheless allowed recovery without
demanding the cestui trace trust money into specific present as-
sets.9 0 In that case the defendant bank, while insolvent, fraud-
ulently accepted the plaintiff's deposit. Four business days later
the bank closed. In the intervening four days there was con-
siderable turnover of cash on hand, and checks were paid in
excess of deposits made. At closing there was more than en-
ough cash on hand to meet the plaintiff's claim, but it was in-
conceivable that the turnover of funds had not affected the spe-
cific money desposited by the plaintiff. Yet the court decreed
a constructive trust preference, and in language indicating ap-
proval of the "swollen assets" rationale said: "There can be
no doubt . . . that the cash assets of the insolvent bank were
enhanced by the receipt of this money. Neither can there be
88. Id. at 29, 53 N.W. at 176.
89. 22 N.D. 396, 133 N.W. 1020 (1911).
90. Cf. Morton v. Woolery, 48 N.D. 1132, 189 N.W. 232 (1922) (similar case
assumed trust in assets without mention of tracing problem).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
any doubt that the money turned over to the receiver was more
by the amount paid the bank than it would have been had it
not been paid the bank. The bank took appellant's money and
the funds in its possession . . . were to that extent increased." 91
Instead of requiring the plaintiff to trace and identify his money
as part of the cash on hand, the court applied the rule that
where a trustee mingles trust funds with his own money, any
money paid out of the common fund is presumed to be the trus-
tees personal funds, and not trust money."-' The burden of prov-
ing that the cash on hand did not contain the plaintiff's depos-
it was placed squarely upon the bank, but it was estopped to
assert that it had paid out trust funds while retaining its own
funds, thus neatly relieving the plaintiff of any burden of trac-
ing or identificationY
In 1930, with Behm v. Baird,"4 the court directly reversed
its position with a flat rejection of the "swollen assets" theory.
Here too the defendant bank was insolvent at the time it ac-
cepted the plaintiff's deposit, just as in the Widman case. The
plaintiff asserted his trust claim only against the cash on hand at
closing, and thus seemed in a position identical to that of the
successful plaintiff in the Widman case. This time however, no
recovery was allowed. The court said, "Plaintiff claims the as-
sets of the bank were augmented by his deposit. This would
be good so far as it goes if proved, but not enough; he must
trace the funds."9  The court stated there could be no trust
preference short of proof by the plaintiff that actual proceeds
of the check he deposited made up the cash on hand at clos-
ing, and that it was not cash received from other depositors.9"
How this reasoning can be reconciled with the strong presump-
tion and burden of proof rules laid down in Widman v. Kellogg
is inconceivable to the present writer.
By 1931 the court was already deviating from the strict
rule announced only the year before. Larson v. Baird- allowed
the plaintiff the benefit of the presumption that commingled
funds returned to the insolvent bank contained the proceeds
of his converted trust property, although strict adherence to the
91. Widman v. Kellogg, 22 N.D. 396, 402, 133 N.W. 1020, 1023 (1911).
92. Id. at 403, 133 N.W. at 1023.
93. Bogert cites the case in support of the majority "tracing" theory. 4 Bogert,
Trusts & Trustees §921 n.5 (Part 2, 1948).
94. 59 N.D. 733, 231 N.W. 876 (1930).
95. Id. at 739, 231 N.W. at 878.
96. Id. at 741, 231 N.W. at 879.
97. 60 N.D. 775, 236 N.W. 634 (1931).
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rule of Behm v. Baird would have required the plaintiff to prove
that the funds returned were not made up of money derived
from other sources. However, the court paid lip service to the
"tracing" theory. The next year, in State v. Farmers' State Bank,'
the "swollen assets" theory returned in full force. In that case,
the bank received the plaintiff's deposit of checks subject to a
constructive trust, but immediately cleared the checks with an-
other bank. "Practically immediately . . .the checks . . .were
used .. . to pay an indebtedness of the bank. Instead of draw-
ing out of the cash on hand and paying the indebtedness of
the bank, and thus depleting the cash to this extent, these checks
were used. . . In this way the assets of the bank were aug-
mented." 99 The constructive trust was enforced against the as-
sets because the plaintiff had shown ". . . fraud practiced on it
• . . assets augmented by this amount, and that the cash value
which the checks represented was used to pay the debt, thus saving
the cash on hand." 110 It is difficult to imagine language more indic-
ative of the reasoning associated with the "swollen assets" doctrine;
yet there was no repudiation of the "tracing" rule.1",
In a 1940 case 102 where the trust proceeds were, as a mat-
ter of fact, easily traceable, the court reaffirmed its original ad-
herence to the tracing theory. In the opinion of the writer, the
status of the North Dakota law on this problem is not as con-
fused as it may appear on first inspection. The court seems to
have adhered consistently to a policy of professing acceptance
of the strict "tracing" rule, but applying what in fact amounts
to the "swollen assets" rule wherever the equities of the indi-
vidual case evoke application of the latter less stringent rule
to prevent a miscarriage of justice. Occasionally the court, with-
out reference to the "tracing" problem, allows recovery where
the plaintiff has failed to assume the burden of indentifying
his trust proceeds. 03 Other cases allow recovery by stretching
the definition of "tracing" to include the facts at hand.104 This
elasticity in defining and applying the doctrine does not seem
98. 62 N.D. 426, 244 N.W. 45 (1932).
99. Id. at 432, 244 N.W. at 48.
100. Id. at 434, 244 N.W. at 48.
101. Id. at 433, 244 N.W. at 48, "The depositor has traced the cash value
of the checks into this fund. He may follow such property and reclaim it in any
form into which it may have been changed, providing identification is possible."
Bogert cites the case in support of the "swollen assets" theory. 4 Bogert, Trusts &
Trustee §922 n.18, (Part 2, 1948).
102. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Thompson, 70 N.D. 99, 292 N.W. 85
(1940) (proceeds of unauthorized sale traced to bank account).
103. See Morton v. Woolery, 48 N.D. 1132, 189 N.W. 232 (1922).
104. See Larson v. Baird, 60 N.D. 775, 236 N.W. 634 (1931).
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out of place when one considers that the original purpose of
Equity was to introduce elasticity into a legal system grown brit-
tle by strict adherence to precedent despite hardship and in-
justice in specific cases.
Another limitation of major practical significance is the re-
quirement of clear and convincing evidence to prove the con-
structive fraud alleged as the basis for trust relief. "The evi-
dence must be strong enough to lead to but one conclusion. If the
evidence is doubtful or capable of reasonable explanation upon
theories other than the existence of a trust it is not sufficient
to establish a trust." 105 Mere proof of suspicious circumstances
is not enough. 10e But a constructive trust may be created, al-
though the evidence supporting it is almost entirely circum-
stantial. 1° 7 Where the trust claimant seeks to prove that an abso-
lute deed was taken subject to an oral trust, the Statute of Frauds
ordinarily does not prohibit such evidence,"'8 but an oral trust
in land is unenforceable where no special circumstances sus-
pend operation of the Statute.0 9 It has been held that declar-
ations of the grantor made prior to or contemporaneously with
execution and delivery of a deed are admissible to support a
constructive trust, but declarations made subsequent to the trans-
action and not in the grantee's presence are inadmissable.11o
Since the constructive trust is by nature a remedy of equity,
an early case refused relief where the suit was erroneously
brought as an action at law."' Although a repetition of that de-
cision would be unlikely today, it serves as a reminder that cer-
tain limitations are imposed upon a litigant seeking equitable
105. Lander v. Hartson, 77 N.D. 923, 931, 47 N.W.2d 211 (1951) (plain-
tiff failed to prove defendant purchased stock as agent and not for his own account).
106. McKenzie County v. Casady, 55 N.D. 475. 214 N.W. 461 (1927); First
Nat. Bank v. Mensing, 46 N.D. 184, 180 N.W. 58 (1920) (fact that insolvent debtor
purchas'd land, in names of his children not fraudulent).
107. See Bodding v. Herman, 76 N.D. 324, 335, 35 N.W.2d 561, 566. "All the
actions of the defendant bear him out. He took the greater risk in connection with
the'transactions. The confidence shown by each party in the other explains the loose-
ness of the transactions between them. The failure of the'plaintiff to produce 'he
original records raises an inference against him . . . . The court has come to the
conclusion that . . . the acts of the parties and the circumstances shown in the evi-
dence establish the defendant's claims .... "
108. Hughes v. Fargo Loan Agency, 46 N.D. 26, 178 N.W. 993 (1929) (parol
understanding failed to create express trust but justified imposition of constructive
trust); Hanson v. Svarverud, 18 N.D. 550, 553, 120 N.W. 550, 551 (1909) "A
court of equity will enforce a trust agreement under such ,circumstances, although the
requirements of the statute of frauds have not been complied with."
109. Weber v. Bader, 42 N.D. 142, 172 N.W. 72 (1919) (land purchased under
agreement to hold it for joint use with others held free of trust).
110. McDonald v. Miller, 73 N.D. 474, 16 N.W.2d 270 (1944).
111. Prondzinski v. Garbut, 8 N.D. 191, 77 N.W. 1012 (1898) (refused
damages at law). But cf. Prondzinski v. Garbut, 10 N.D. 300, 86 N.W. 969 (1901)
(same case correctly brought resulted in declaration of constructive trust and re-
covery of value of converted trust res).
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relief. Thus a constructive trust will not be imposed where the
plaintiff has rested too long without asserting his right, 11 or
has not come into court with clean hands."' Since a decree of
equity is a matter of grace and not of right, the court may re-
quire that the plaintiff do equity as a condition of granting the
constructive trust."' It is fitting that any discussion of con-
structive trusts close with an acknowledgment that this extra-
ordinary remedy is today, as it was centuries ago, essentially a
device to insure a just result where the issue is the simple one of
right and wrong.
II. RESULTING TRUSTS
Resulting trusts constitute the second major category of im-
plied trusts. Here the word "implied" is used in a sense similar
to its meaning in the law of implied contracts. The existence of
the resulting trust depends upon acts or expressions of the par-
ties indicating an intent that a trust relation result from their
transaction. Unlike the constructive trust, the resulting trust is
not judicially imposed because. of fraud." 5 The indispensable
requirement is the establishment of a trust intent by evidence
which is "clear, specific, satisfactory, and of such a character
as to leave in the mind of the chancellor no hesitation or sub-
stantial doubt.""' The court's function is not to create the trust,
as it creates a constructive trust, but only to recognize and en-
force the trust. 17 Thus the North Dakota code is not strictly
correct in including resulting trusts in a section dealing with
trusts created by law. 11 Resulting trusts are trusts created by
the parties.
North Dakota statutory law on the creation of resulting
trusts is centered around a single code subsection and apparently
recognizes only the purchase money type of resulting trusts. The
statute recites: "When a transfer of real property is made to
112. Wehe v. Wehe, 44 N.D. 280, 175 N.W. 366 (1919).
113. Fleischer v. Fleischer, 11 N.D. 221, 91 N.W. 51 (1902) (refused constructive
trust which would have perfected claimant's purpose to evade statute).
114. Merchants Bank v. Schatz, 59 N.D. 365, 371, 230 N.W. 18, 20 (1930)
"But this is an action in equity .... The plaintiff must do equity, and, therefore,
under these circumstances, though it is entitled to be decreed the owner of the property,
it must take such property charged with . . . the claim for which it is responsible."
115. See, eg., Hyland v. Tousley, 67 N.D. 612, 275 N.W. 340 (1937) (re-
sulting trust enforced without mention of fraud; Dalrfmple v. Security L. & T. Co.,
9 N.D. 306, 83 N.W. 245 (1900) (resulting trust enforced although no fraud was
alleged).
116. Carter v. Carter, 14 N.D. 66, 103 N.W. 425 (1905).
117. 2 Bogert, Trusts & Trustees §452 (1935).
118. N.D. Rev. Code §59-0106 (1943).
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one person and the consideration therefor is paid by or for an-
other, a trust is presumed to result in favor of the person by or
for whom such payment is made." "'5 It must be noted that the
rule is limited to real property. The readily apparent primary
factor in this type of implied trust is the element of consider-
ation. If the trust proponent can establish that the consideration
was paid by or for him he,.will likely enforce his trust. Equity
here take cognizance of the ordinarily selfish and aquisitive na-
ture of men when dealing with property. The normal desire
to obtain value in exchange for value paid out, and the less
ordinary intent to donate property, form the common sense
foundation of the trust presumption. 120  Purchase money result-
ing trusts were well established in equity long before the origi-
nal Statute of Frauds and were expressly excepted from its oper-
ation. 12 1 In fact the common law inferred a resulting trust intent
whenever one man gratuitously transferred land to another.
122
In North Dakota the doctrine of the purchase money result-
ing trust was established by the leading case of Dalrymple v.
Security L. & T. Co.12 3 In that case a father bought and paid for
a tract of land. However, he directed that the deed be made in
the name of his brother as grantee. Circumstantial evidence in-
dicated an intent that the brother hold this land as trustee for
the purchaser's children, who were plaintiffs in the action. There
was no written reference to a trust, but the court held that a
trust resulted since the purchase had been by one who paid the
consideration for someone other than the named grantee. The
court was not inclined to presume a gift to the purchaser's bro-
ther.
Frequently a husband purchases land and pays the consider-
ation, but takes the conveyance in his wife's name. In such
cases the normal presumption is that the husband intends a
gift to his wife, but this is a presumption of fact and can be
rebutted by convincing evidence that a trust was intended.12
119. Ibid.
120. See 2 Bogert, Trusts & Trustees §454 (1935).
121. 4 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence §§1030, 1040 (Symons 1941).
122. For a brief historical background see Meriwether, Resulting Trusts-Part
Payment of the Purchase Price, 2 Ark. L. Rev. 53 (1948).
123. 9 N.D. 306, 83 N.W. 245 (1900).
124. 2 Bogert, Trusts & Trustees §459 (1935); see Kosters v. Hoover, 98 F.2d
595, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1938) "The general rule is well established that when the pur-
chase money is paid by one and the property is taken in the name of another, a result-
ing trust arises in favor of the party paying. However, there is an equally well:
established exception to the rule, to the effect that when the person who pays the
purchase money has the title conveyed to his wife, the purchase and the conveyance
are presumed to constitute a gift or advancement to the wife, or a settlement upon her,
because of the husband's legal duty to make provision for his wife. This presump-
NOTES
The conflict between the ordinary presumption of trust where
the purchaser takes title in another's name, and the counter pre-
sumption of gift between husband and wife is illustrated in
Roberge v. Roberge.121 There the plaintiff, in a suit against his
six children, sought to have an absolute deed to his deceased
wife declared a trust deed. The plaintiff had bought the land
by making a partial down payment and giving notes secured by
a mortgage for the remainder. Both the plaintiff and his wife
assumed liability on the notes and mortgage. The plaintiff, act-
ing on mistaken legal advice, conveyed the land to his wife on
the oral understanding that it would belong to both as secur-
ity for their old age. In spite of testimony that the wife, as busi-
ness head of the family, gave the plaintiff money to make the
payments, the court found that the consideration was paid by
him. It was held that the presumption of gift did not apply,
since the plaintiff had established a contrary trust intent. Justices
Birdzell and Christianson joined in an extremely cogent and
persuasive dissent 126 which questioned the efficacy of the evi-
dence to prove more than a claim on the land for the plaintiff's
old age. Attention was focused upon the plaintiff's own testi-
mony as indicative of an intent to give his wife a beneficial as
well as a bare legal interest. Judge Birdzell pointed out that the
burden of proof carried by the proponent of a resulting trust is
necessarily heavy, and his evidence must be more than a mere
preponderance, because his purpose is to overthrow the normal
legal effect of his own act of placing title in another. It is sub-
mitted that the majority decision reached the more equitable
result. Bearing in mind that the defendants were seeking to
defeat their own father's old age security plan by claiming
through their deceased mother, it is understandable that equity
might strain the usual rules to aid the father.127 A strikingly simi-
lar case held the plaintiff estopped to contest the absolute nature
of a deed to his wife by waiting until after her death.1 2
The court implied in Redman v. Biewer 129 that the pre-
tion may be rebutted by clear and satisfactory evidence that a resulting trust was
intended."
125. 46 N.D. 402, 180 N.W. 15 (1920).
126.. Id. at 408, 180 N.W. at 17.
127. "Rather sad is the commentary that this property, comprising with the
husband's other property, 'the community' in fact, of the husband's and wife's efforts
of life, should now, near 'the end of his journey,' be sought, by anticipation, through
descent." Id. at 407, 108 N.W. at 17. (this homey comment indicates the real reason
for the decision as one of elemental justice).
128. Wehe v. Wehe, 44 N.D. 280, -175 N.W. 366 (1919).
129. 48 N.W.2d 372 (N.D. 1951).
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sumption of gift also applies in the converse situation where
the wife pays the consideration for a conveyance to her hus-
band. In that case the husband purchased land with his wife's
money, instructing the grantor to make the deed to the wife.
By mistake the husband was named grantee. The evidence show-
ed that all payments were made from the wife's funds, and that
she paid the taxes. The court held that the ordinary presump-
tion of gift had been upset by the evidence, and that the hus-
band held title as trustee of a resulting trust. The presumption
of gift from wife to husband is contrary to the prevailing rule,
but indicative of the modem and more logical trend of legal
thinking. 1 30 Of course, a clear intent to make a gift will not be
defeated by resulting trust rules.' 1
Where only part of the consideration for the purchase is
paid by the party claiming a resulting trust the problem is more
complex. 13 -2 The purchaser may have borrowed part of the price
and placed title in the lender's name for security only. 1 33 Am-
erican courts apply three rules, varying in strictness, to find
a resulting trust in favor of one who has paid only part of the
purchase price. The old rule held the trust claimant to the strict
requirement of proving he paid an "aliquot part" of the price.'34
Thus the United States Supreme Court said in a leading case,
"No trust arises unless his part is some definite portion of the
whole, and is paid for some aliquot part of the property, as a
fourth, a third, or a moiety." 135 Seldom do courts using the term
"aliquot part" intend to employ its strict dictionary meaning of a
part which divides the whole without a remainder 130 but rather
use the term loosely in the sense of a definite part of the price
to enable the court to establish with certainty the proportion
of the property covered by the trust.' 37 A second line of deci-
sions invoke resulting trust principles in part payment cases
only if the trust claimant made an express agreement with the
named grantee that some specific interest in the property be
180. See Cassidy, Trusts Resulting from Part Payment of the Purchase Price,
20 Geo. L. J. 475, 482 (1982).
181. Hunt v. Holmes, 64 N.D. 389, 252 N.W. 876 (1934) (father's gift to
laughter upheld against claim of trust).
132. For an interesting discussion see, Cassidy, Trusts Resulting from Part Pay-
ment of the Purchase Price, 20 Geo. L.J. 475 (1982).
183. See Hyland v. Tousley, 67 N.D. 612, 275 N.W. 340 (1937) (father who
took title to secure purchase money loan to son held as trustee after son repaid loan).
184. Olcott v. Bynum, 17 Wall. 44 (U.S. 1872).
185. Id. at 59.
186. Webster, New Collegiate Dictionary 23 (1949).
1.37. See, e.g., Culp v. Price, 107 Iowa 138, 77 N.W. 848 (1899) (no trust
enforced where amount paid was indefinite); Currence v. Ward, 43 W. Va. 367, 27
S.E. 329 (1897). See 3 Scott, Trusts §454 (1989).
NOTES
his in exchange for his share of the purchase price.:s A third
group of courts, considered by Bogert the majority,'" presume
a resulting trust in favor of the partial payor without much com-
ment about the proportion of his payment to the total price.
The North Dakota case of Fox v. Fox 140 presented a situ-
ation where recovery would have followed by applying even
the most stringent interpretation of "aliquot part". In that case
a father and his three sons made a joint purchase of land in per-
formance of an oral agreement that each would pay one-fourth
of the price and receive a one-fourth interest in the land. For
convenience title was taken in the name of the father as sole
owner. The court, quoting with approval the strict federal
rule 141 of "aliquot part," enforced a resulting trust. The case
does not necessarily establish the strict rule as North Dakota
law; however, for the issue was neither directly raised nor neces-
sary to the decision. The court indicated it might take a more
'liberal view if occasion should demand by saying "Where
the consideration proceeds from two or more persons jointly,
• ..a resulting trust will arise in proportion to the amount of the
consideration which they have respectively contributed." 142
Ordinarily one who expects equitable relief in the form of
a resulting trust must come into court armed with highly per-
suasive evidence.143 The porportion of cases which have denied
relief is much higher than in constructive trust cases. The strong
policy favoring security of real estate titles against oral claims
constrains courts to deny recovery where no special circum-
stances of equitable cognizance, such as payment of purchase
money, operate to suspend the statutory bar of parol evi-
dence. 4 4 Where there is genuine doubt by whom the consider-
ation was paid, and the plaintiffs evidence is sketchy, no trust
will result.145 Resulting trust principles cannot be invoked to
138. Druker v. Druker, 268 Mass. 334, 167 N.E. 638 (1929) (claimant must
have furnished specific and definite part of consideration in return for a determinate
and fixed fraction of the estate); see Moat v. Moat, 301 Mass. 469, 17 N.E.2d 710,
712 (1938).
139. 2 Bogert, Trusts & Trustees §457 (1935) and cases cited n.12.
140. 56 N.D. 899, 219 N.W. 784 (1928).
141. Id. at 908, 219 N.W. 788.
142. Id. at 907, 219 at 788 (italics added).
143. Carter v. Carter, 14 N.D. 66, 67, 103 N.W. 425, 426 (1905) "In order
to overthrow the presumption in favor of defendant's title . . . plaintiff must have
more than a preponderance of evidence. The proof must be 'clear, specific, satis-
factory, and of such a character as to leave in the mind of the chancellor no hesita-
tion or substantial doubt'."
144. Weber v. Bader, 42 N.D. 142, 172 N.W. 72 (1919).
145. Bernauer v. McCaull-Webster Elevator Co., 41 N.D. 561, 171 N.W. 282
(1919).
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give operation to an otherwise imperfect gift "' or to defeat
a gift already perfected 147 because the essential element of clear
trust intent is missing. Nor will the North Dakota courts counte-
nance the use of the resulting trust as a device to give force to
an invalidly created express trust.'4 8 In fact the court has been
rather parsimonious in dispensing equitable relief in the form
of resulting trusts. If a numerical comparison is indicative of the
court's general attitude, it may be notable that relief has been
denied more often than it has been granted.
In closing it must be observed that the field of implied trusts
is replete with exemplary proof that law remains the servant
of justice. All too often laymen deprecate the legal profession
as one conceived in iniquity and dedicated to technicality. Yet
one cannot read implied trust cases without sensing the pro-
found concern for substantive justice that guides courts in dis-
pensing or withholding the extraordinary remedies of constructive
and resulting trusts. Justice is not confined to abstract discussions
but descends to the practical level to provide the decisive factor in
actual controversies.
Jim R. CARRIGAN
146. McWilliams v. Britton, 48 N.D. 975, 188 N.W. 44 (1922); see Hagerott
v. Davis, 73 N.D. 532, 554, 17 N.W.2d 15, 26 (1944).
147. Hunt v. Holmes, 64 N.D. 389, 252 N.W. 376 (1934).
148. See Reel v. Hansboro State Bank, 52 N.D. 182, 191, 201 N.W. 864 (1924)
(dictum states that equity will not aid a volunteer to perfect an incomplete trust).
